This paper analyzes the effects of political and economic institutions on efficiency of transition economies over the 1995-2005 period. Perpetual Inventory Method is used to construct capital series for these countries, and then stochastic production frontier analysis is used to estimate the efficiency scores and effects of institutions at the same time. The empirical results show that better institutions are associated with higher efficiency. However, all else equal, the transition countries in East Asia are more efficient than Central and Eastern European or Former Soviet Union transition countries.
I. Introduction
The significant role of institutions in determining growth has been confirmed in many studies. Barro (1991) shows that growth rate is positively associated with political stability and inversely related to a proxy 1 of market distortions. Mauro (1995) concludes that bureaucratic efficiency causes high investment and growth. Rodrik's (2000) study on 90 countries over [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] leads to a conclusion that the more democratic a country is the smaller the variance of its long run growth. In addition, the effect of institutions on growth is not just to promote capital accumulation as Knack and Keefer (1995) reveal that it is still significant after controlling for factor accumulation and policy. This suggests that institutions should be an important determinant of productivity and efficiency.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of institutions on efficiency in the context of transition economies. Since the fall of the socialist system, former socialist countries have undergone a transformation process from a centrally planned economy to a market-based economic system. We have observed marked difference in economic performance of these economies. In Eastern Europe and Central Asia, almost all of transition countries experienced sharp output fall in the early 1990s and then went through a recovery process with positive growth rates. At the same time in East Asia China, Vietnam and Cambodia managed to grow at high and steady rates.
While factor accumulation certainly plays an important part in explaining growth, differences in efficiency also matter, especially when a lot of "creative destruction" is taking place. For many transition countries the problem is more about utilizing existing factors efficiently than about accumulating them. We can say that they have been operating below the production possibility frontier (PPF) and it will take them a while to get to the level of efficiency attained in advanced economies. Moreover, due to differences in initial conditions, the speed of transition and socio-economic settings, we can expect large variation in efficiency level of these countries.
During the transition process, different institutional settings, both political and economic, have emerged in these countries. As noted in Murrell (2003) , institutional quality in transition economies in general has improved quickly. However, there is a huge divergence in the levels of institutional development. Kaufmann et al. (2005) show that countries like Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland have institutional quality that is in many aspects 1 The deviation from the sample mean of the purchasing power parity for investment in 1960.
comparable to those of developed countries while other countries continue to lag far behind.
Therefore, the experience of transition countries in terms of recovering from a disrupted system and building necessary institutions for a market economy can be viewed as something close to a natural experiment for analyzing the effect of institutions on growth in general and improvement in efficiency in particular.
Theoretically, there are many channels through which institutions can affect economic growth and efficiency. Democratic regimes with check and balance mechanisms are better able to curb corruption and prevent misuse of productive resources, especially in investment activities involving public funds, which is good for growth and efficiency. Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000) find that corruption is lower when democratic norms and institutions are stronger. In an effort to explain corruption Treisman (2000) also concludes that democracy reduces corruption though it is well established democracy rather than recent democratization process that matters (Sung (2004) also comes to similar conclusion). Good institutions can encourage accumulation of physical capital, human capital and technological knowledge and these factors in turn help improve efficiency. Bevan et al. (2004) finds that development of legal institutions has positive effect on FDI inflows to transition countries in Europe, which is supposed to bring in more advanced technologies to local economies and help enhance their efficiency. In addition, economic freedom is found by Dawson (1998) , among others, to affect growth directly via total factor productivity and indirectly through investment. Lawson and Walter Block and stochastic frontier analysis, Adkins et al. (2002) show that increase in economic freedom leads to higher efficiency. However, two measures of political freedom, namely civil liberties and political rights taken from the Freedom House Index, are not significant in their model. In an attempt to test the relationship between governance, as reported in Kaufmann et al. (1999) , and technical efficiency, Meon and Weill (2005) find that for a sample of 62 countries in 1990 better governance, especially government efficiency, is associated with greater technical efficiency.
To the best of our knowledge, there has not been any research that digs into the relationship between institution and efficiency in transition economies since the collapse of the Soviet Bloc. Perhaps it is because of the lack of data about institutions, capital and labour in these countries. One of the contributions of this paper is to estimate capital series for these countries from gross investment data using the Perpetual Inventory Method. Then, following Battese and Coelli (1995) , stochastic frontier analysis is used to estimate the efficiency and effect of institutions on efficiency at the same time by maximum likelihood technique.
The next section presents an overview of the literature on stochastic frontier analysis and the specification of the production and efficiency functions. It will be followed by description of data in Section III and empirical results in Section IV. Section V will conclude the paper.
II. The stochastic frontier analysis and the modelling of efficiency
Stochastic frontier model
The stochastic frontier production function was independently developed by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977 
where with i = 1, …, N and t =1, …, T; is the logarithm of the output for country i in
x is a vector of inputs (in log), and β is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated. vit is assumed to be iid N(0, σv2) random error and distributed independently of u it .
Technical inefficiency u it is a non-negative random variable assumed to be independently distributed such that u it is obtained by truncation (at zero) of the normal distribution
δ σ . In another word, the technical inefficiency effect u it is modelled as:
where the random error w it is assumed to follow normal distribution N(0,σ 2 ) truncated at such a point that ≥0; the is a vector of explanatory variables associated with technical inefficiency and
δ is a vector of unknown coefficients to be estimated.
The maximum likelihood estimation of the model's coefficients is facilitated by Battese and Corra (1977) Coelli, 1996) . σ 2 is the sum of variances of the stochastic error and the inefficiency term and γ is the ratio of variance of the inefficiency term over the total variance. If γ is significant we can say that the inefficiency matters and we can model the inefficiency.
2 Pitt and Lee (1981), Kalirajan and Shand (1986).
Specification of production function and modelling of efficiency
In stochastic frontier analysis, specification of production function is important because efficiency is measured against an estimated frontier. If the frontier function is misspecified the conclusion about the dynamics or determination of efficiency may be wrong.
The Cobb-Douglas production function is widely used in the literature on economic growth. In this paper, we will also estimate the production frontier with both translog and Cobb-Douglas technologies. The production frontier equations are:
(ii) Translog:
Here, is the logarithm of output for country i at time t, k is the logarithm of capital stock and l is the logarithm of labour. The time trend (t) is added to account for movement in the frontier (Kneller and Stevens, 2003) .
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To examine the effect of institutions on efficiency, the inefficiency term is modelled as a function of the degree of economic freedom as proxied by the Index of 
III. Data
This research uses a panel of 28 transition economies over the 1995-2005 period. The selection of countries and time period is mainly on the basis of data availability. 1995 is the year when the Index of Economic Freedom data was first available. Two types of data that need detailing are input-output data and measures of institutions.
Input-output data
The growth and efficiency literature usually uses either the World Bank's STARS dataset 4 or Summer and Heston's dataset (Penn World Table) . However, these datasets do not include all transition countries. So for the purpose of this research we use the World Bank Development Indicators (WBDIs) for output (GDP), gross investment and labour. Output is total GDP converted to 2000 constant US dollar at official exchange rate. The data on labour is the total labour force in the relevant countries.
Since capital stock data are not available for all countries in the sample in any existing databases, the transition countries' investment series (gross capital formation) are used to construct capital series by applying the Perpetual Inventory Method. According to the method, the capital stock evolves as follows:
with δ being the depreciation rate of capital.
By rearranging (7) we obtain:
where g is the growth rate of the capital stock which is assumed to be equal the average of GDP growth rates over the estimation period.
Selecting the correct depreciation rate δ in calculating capital stocks is very important.
If the rate is too high capital accumulation will be low and productivity growth will be overestimated and vice versa. In the growth literature one depreciation rate is often applied across the whole sample of countries, be they developed or developing countries (4% in Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993) and 7% in Easterly and Rebelo (1993) ). However, depreciation rates applied to developed and developing countries should be different because investment projects in developing countries are normally not as efficient as those in developed countries.
That is not to mention corruption which is more pronounced in developing countries than in developed ones. Bu (2006) estimates depreciation rates from firm level data of some developing countries and finds them to be much higher than rates used in the above-cited growth and efficiency analyses. Prichett (2000) reports that over half of developing countries in the sample under investigation have negative total factor productivity. One possible explanation could be the overvaluation of capital which is equivalent to low depreciation rate.
Therefore, in this paper the capital series are generated with a depreciation rate δ =10% 5 .
Unfortunately, we unable to compare our capital series with existing ones because they are only available for pre-1990 periods 6 but we do not have investment series for most of transition countries (all but China and Hungary) to estimate capital stock before 1990. values of the variables are calculated with data available from various sources 9 which are less subject to subjective survey data. Each factor is graded from 1 to 5, with a score of 1 representing an economic environment that is the most conducive to economic freedom. To avoid using the composite index we apply the Principal Component Analysis to the ten IEF factors and select some principal components as measures of economic freedom. This technique can help reduce the dimensionality of the original data while retaining the maximum variation of the underlying variables. The principal components, by construction, are independent of each other. The parallel analysis and the Velicer's minimum average partial correlation analysis for selecting number of components to be retained indicate that we should use two components. As a result, economic institutions in this paper will be represented by the first two principal components (COMP1 and COMP2). environment and more freedom in the business environment. Between the first two components they explain 64.3% of the total variance of all factors.
Measures of institutions
As for political institutions two measures are widely used in the literature: civil liberties (CL) and political rights (PR). These measures are published by the Freedom House which uses surveys and assessment reports to evaluate the actual rights and freedoms enjoyed by individuals. PR and CL are scored from one to seven for each country in each year with larger number indicating less freedom. PR and CL are highly correlated (0.94) in this sample.
In the actual estimations, a simple average index of them (FHI) is also used (estimations with PR and CL used separately are reported in the Annex - Table A .2). 
IV. Empirical results and discussions
Both Translog and Cobb-Douglas production functions are estimated with the final efficiency model being:
Regressions are run with one regional dummy separately and with CEE as control group but only the EA dummy is significant. PR, CL and the simple average of them (FHI) are used separately in the regressions but there are no qualitative changes. Changes in terms of coefficients' magnitude are not substantial. Table 2 presents the result with FHI as measure of political freedom, with and without and EA -dummy for East Asia (see Table A .2 for results with PR and CL). Note: t-ratio in parenthesis; *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
In all specifications the likelihood ratio test results show that the coefficients of the efficiency equation and σ 2 and γ are jointly significant. This means the specification of the model is correct. The significance of the variance parameters σ 2 (sum of variances) and γ (variance of inefficiency term over sum of variances) indicates that technical efficiency does matter in the production function and that the stochastic specification is appropriate. With γ being very close to one in all specifications we can say that variation in technical efficiency is substantial among transition economies.
In efficiency analysis, it is important to have good specification of the production function since different technologies will result in different measures of efficiency. As mentioned in Section II the Cobb-Douglas technology has been rejected in several tests. Here, following the same line, specification tests are also done by calculating generalized likelihood ratios and they show that translog models should be used in frontier and efficiency analyses for transition economies (the ratios are 447.4 and 465.2 for specification with and without EA dummy respectively).
The first important finding of this paper is the significance of economic and political freedoms in determining efficiency. In all the models presented in the Table 2 , economic and political freedoms have positive and significant coefficients. Since u it in equation (9) is inefficiency (or distance from the frontier) and higher values of economic and political freedoms means less freedom, the positive coefficients can be interpreted as implying that higher level of freedom is associated with higher level of efficiency.
Empirically, the effect of democracy on growth and efficiency has been controversial in the literature. Minier (1998) finds that countries that democratized early growth faster than others who did not choose a democratic path. Barro (1996) reports a hump-shaped relationship between democracy and growth. When trying to disentangle the effect of democracy on growth Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) concludes that, overall, the negative effect of democracy is larger than the positive one. In Adkins et al. (2002) the Political Rights and Civil Liberties are not significant. Here they do turn out to be significant both through the composite index and on their own (Table A. 3), even after the economic freedom has been controlled for. This is consistent with the result found in Meon and Weill (2005) for a larger set of countries that the rule of law and control of corruption are associated with higher efficiency.
The second significant finding is that the coefficient of East Asia dummy is negative and significant. This means that East Asia's transition economies on average, ceteris paribus, are more efficient than the Eastern European and Former Soviet Union countries in the sample. This empirical result may look counter-intuitive for some people since many Eastern European countries (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland for example) have rather advanced production base vis-à-vis the East Asian ones. However, this result can manifest the fact that the Eastern European transition economies underwent an initial period of "disorganization" when the old production system was destroyed almost overnight and a new one has not been in place 11 . It takes time to build new business links, to employ new technology and to adjust production methods to market signals, especially when market was fledgling. At the same time China, Vietnam and, to a lesser extent, Cambodia had been experimenting with market economy for a while before the beginning of the period under study. The interesting point is that East Asian transition countries manage to use more efficiently the resources they have 11 Blanchard and Kremer (1997) .
though they have less production capacity than Central and Eastern European ones in this period.
Among the East Asian economies China was the first to reform and adopt market economy, though gradually. More importantly, China is a huge country and it has produced a remarkable growth rate since the beginning of its reform. Therefore there are reasons to believe that the East Asian effect is dominated by China and possibly only by China. To check if Cambodia and Vietnam also have the efficiency effect the model (3) in Table 2 is estimated again with a dummy for China and another one for Cambodia and Vietnam in the efficiency equation. The result is that are both significant (see Table A .4). Thus we can safely confirm that the three East Asian economies have higher efficiency than the other countries in the sample given the same level of production factors and institutions. All this said, it is worth mentioning that East Asian countries have less economic and political freedom on average (3.68 compared to 3.06 of CEE and 3.5 of FSU on aggregate EFI score; 6.39 compared with 2.15 and 4.38 on FHI).
V. Conclusion
The role of institutions in economic growth and efficiency has been discussed widely Among these transition economies, the East Asian ones are, ceteris paribus, more efficient than others. Moreover, this effect is not wholly limited to China. This may be due to the famous dual approach to reform and liberalization that was first initiated by China and then followed by Vietnam and Cambodia when they moved away from planned economy.
Though the issue of causality between institution and efficiency is controversial and the results obtained here are subject to questions, hopefully this paper will contribute to clearer understanding of the role of institutions, both economic and political. 
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